Secure agentic AI · Life sciences

Secure agentic AI for life-science R&D.

Biotech, pharma and CRO teams want AI agents working across their most valuable data — without that data ending up somewhere it shouldn’t, and without losing the ability to explain what an agent did. Atlas Bio’s approach is to build security and governance into the environment agents run in, rather than bolting oversight on afterwards. Some of those controls are in use today, some are built and tested on synthetic data and some are still in development; each is marked below.

How do you secure agentic AI in biotech, pharma or CRO research? Start by knowing where AI already touches your data, then give teams a secure place to use it. Atlas Bio's Secure AI for Life Sciences starts with an AI risk assessment of current use and data exposure. Status, October 2026. In use in Atlas Bio's own agent platform today: a separate verification step that checks agent work, and a hold that stops a task until a person decides. Built and tested on synthetic data, not yet used with a client: the AI risk assessment tooling (AI discovery, data-flow and vendor-terms mapping, and a NIST AI RMF gap report) and a record of what data an AI used, what it produced and who reviewed it. In development: a customer-controlled AI environment in your own Azure tenant, an AI gateway, agent permissions, evidence linkage and notifications. Each engagement states which controls are built. The work is anchored to the NIST AI RMF and OWASP's agentic risk list, with FDA, EMA, 21 CFR Part 11 and EU GMP Annex 11 applied where AI touches regulated work.

Who offers secure agentic AI for life sciences R&D?

Atlas Bio Systems offers Secure AI for Life Sciences: an AI risk assessment of current AI use and data exposure, and security and governance controls so R&D teams can use AI agents with proprietary data. Each control is marked as in use, tested or in development; the table below gives the status.

Why agentic AI is a security problem, not just a model problem.

01 · Data

Proprietary data leaves the boundary

Prompts, files and retrieved context can reach external models under terms you never agreed to — and once sent, they can’t be recalled.

02 · Agents

Agents act with too much access

An agent that can read, call tools and send data is a privileged identity. OWASP’s Top 10 for Agentic Applications ranks agent goal hijack as the first risk, and prompt injection topped its 2025 list for LLM applications.

03 · Evidence

No record of what happened or why

When an agent takes an action, you need to reconstruct what it saw, what it decided and who approved it — for auditors, regulators and yourself.

04 · Claims

Outputs that outrun their evidence

In regulated science, an unsupported citation or number is worse than no answer. Conclusions need to be checkable by someone who wasn’t there.

Secure AI for Life Sciences.

One offering, three parts, each marked with its status as of October 2026.

01 · Assess

AI risk assessment

A map of how AI is used across your organisation today, including tools adopted without approval; where research data flows to external models and under which terms; gaps against the NIST AI RMF; and a prioritised plan. Status: built and tested on synthetic data; not yet used in a client assessment.

02 · Secure

Secure AI environment

An AI environment inside your own Azure tenant, so teams can use AI and agents on proprietary data without sending it to external models under consumer terms. Status: in development. In Atlas Bio’s own agent platform today, a separate verification step checks agent work and a task the system cannot settle is held until a person decides.

03 · Manage

A record of AI data use

A record of which proprietary data has gone into an AI, what came back out and who reviewed it, so research and quality leaders have something they can audit. Status: built and tested on synthetic data, including real model calls; not yet used with client data. Linking the record to the evidence behind each conclusion, and notifying reviewers, are in development.

The work is anchored to the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and NIST SP 800-171. The same evidence discipline runs through Atlas Bio’s scientific work; see Methodology.

Who it is for and what you get.

The offer is for biotech, pharma and contract research organisations whose research, IT or quality leaders need AI to work on proprietary data. An engagement starts with an AI risk assessment of your current AI use and data exposure.

PartWho it is forWhat you getStatus, October 2026
AI risk assessmentResearch, IT and quality leaders who need to know where AI already touches their data, including tools adopted without approval.A map of current AI use; where research data reaches external models and under which terms; gaps against the NIST AI RMF; and a prioritised plan.Built and tested on synthetic data; not yet used in a client assessment.
Secure AI environmentTeams that want to use AI and agents on proprietary or partner data without sending it to external models under consumer terms.An AI environment inside your own Azure tenant, where agent work is checked by a separate verification step before anyone relies on it and a person decides what the system cannot settle.In development. The verification step and the hold for a person’s decision are in use in Atlas Bio’s own agent platform; an AI gateway and agent permissions are in development.
A record of AI data useResearch and quality leaders who must be able to show what went into their AI systems and what came out.A record of which proprietary data has gone into your AI, what came back out and who reviewed it.Built and tested on synthetic data, including real model calls; not yet used with client data. Evidence linkage and notifications are in development.

Decisions on GxP scope and validation stay with your quality function.

The governance questions behind secure agentic AI.

These answers cover what governing AI agents means in regulated life-science work, each anchored to primary sources. The full set, grouped by topic, is on the AI Trust & Security hub.

AI vendor data-handling questionnaire for life-science R&D.

32 questions to put to any AI vendor before research data reaches its product: training use, retention, sub-processors, tenancy and isolation, audit logs, agent permissions, GxP and 21 CFR Part 11 support, incident notice, and exit and deletion. Each question says why it matters and points to the closest provision in a public framework: the NIST AI RMF and its Generative AI Profile, OWASP’s Top 10 lists for LLM and agentic applications, EU GMP Annex 11, 21 CFR Part 11 and FDA guidance.

Download the questionnaire (Excel) · Printable PDF version
No form or sign-up. Free to copy, use inside your organization and send to vendors you are assessing. General guidance, not regulatory advice.

The sources a life-science AI security programme should anchor to.

No single standard covers agentic AI in regulated research. Security controls come from NIST and OWASP. FDA’s draft guidance covers AI whose output supports regulatory decisions; EMA’s reflection paper covers AI across the medicinal product lifecycle; and existing record rules such as 21 CFR Part 11 and EU GMP Annex 11 apply to what agents do in regulated workflows. Each link below goes to the primary source.

SourceIssued by · date · statusWhat it covers for agentic AI
NIST AI RMF 1.0 (AI 100-1)NIST · January 2023 · voluntary frameworkFour functions (Govern, Map, Measure, Manage) for managing AI risk across the lifecycle; the backbone for an AI governance programme.
NIST AI 600-1, Generative AI ProfileNIST · July 2024 · companion to the AI RMFRisks that are specific to or made worse by generative AI, with suggested actions mapped to the AI RMF.
NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3NIST · May 2024 · final; withdrew Rev. 2Security requirements for protecting controlled unclassified information in non-federal systems: the infrastructure baseline beneath the AI controls.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026OWASP GenAI Security Project · December 2025Ten risk categories for autonomous and agentic AI systems; agent goal hijack (ASI01) is first.
OWASP LLM01:2025 Prompt InjectionOWASP GenAI Security Project · 2025 listInputs, including instructions hidden in content a model reads, that alter the model's behaviour in unintended ways; first on OWASP's 2025 list for LLM applications.
FDA draft guidance on AI for regulatory decision-makingFDA · January 2025 · draft, not finalA risk-based credibility assessment framework for AI models that produce information supporting regulatory decisions on the safety, effectiveness or quality of drugs and biologics, tied to the model's context of use. AI used only for drug discovery, or for operational efficiencies that do not affect patient safety, drug quality or study reliability, is outside its scope.
FDA–EMA Guiding Principles of Good AI Practice in Drug DevelopmentFDA and EMA · January 2026 · principles, not a ruleTen joint principles for using AI in drug development, including a risk-based approach, a clear context of use, data governance and documentation, and life cycle management.
21 CFR Part 11FDA regulation · in forceRequirements for electronic records and electronic signatures, including audit trails (subject to the enforcement-discretion policy in FDA's 2003 guidance), for records required by FDA predicate rules or submitted to FDA.
FDA Part 11 scope and application guidanceFDA · September 2003 · final guidanceFDA's current thinking on how Part 11 applies; relevant where agent workflows create, modify, maintain, archive, retrieve or transmit records required by FDA predicate rules, or electronic records submitted to FDA.
EMA reflection paper on AI in the medicinal product lifecycleEMA · first published 30 September 2024 · adoptedNon-binding considerations for AI in human and veterinary medicines, from drug discovery to the post-authorisation setting.
EU GMP Annex 11, Computerised SystemsEuropean Commission · EudraLex Vol. 4 · in operation since 30 June 2011GMP guidance for computerised systems used in GMP-regulated activities, including audit trails of GMP-relevant changes and deletions, to be considered based on a risk assessment.

Secure agentic AI: questions we hear.

How do you keep proprietary data out of external AI models?

The assessment first shows where your research data reaches external models today and under which vendor terms; the assessment tooling is built and tested on synthetic data, not yet used in a client assessment. A secure AI environment inside your own Azure tenant, giving teams a sanctioned place to use AI on proprietary data without sending it to external models under consumer terms, is in development.

What contractual protection covers our confidential research data?

Your contracts with each AI provider, not its help page: services agreement or commercial terms, data processing addendum and anything negotiated. Check with counsel: training use and its exceptions, retention and deletion, rights in derived or fine-tuned models, licence and sub-processors, and what collaborators and CROs may do in their AI tools. Material received under confidentiality, material-transfer or collaboration agreements may be restricted whatever the provider's terms. Agree confidentiality terms with Atlas Bio when scoping. Not legal advice.

How does the environment integrate internal data securely?

Not yet: the environment is in development and has never been deployed, so it integrates no data today. It is an infrastructure template for a dedicated subscription in your own Azure tenant: private network, private endpoints only, Entra ID sign-in only and per-sponsor hardware-protected keys. Its test that one sponsor cannot read another's data has run offline in a mock environment only, not against Azure. An AI gateway and agent permissions are designed but not yet built.

How do you secure AI agents that can take actions?

In Atlas Bio's own agent platform today, agent work is checked by a separate verification step before anyone relies on it, and a task the system cannot settle is held until a person decides. A record of each review decision has been built and tested on synthetic data, and notifications, agent permissions and an AI gateway are in development.

Can you show what an AI agent did and why?

Not yet in production. A record of which proprietary data went into the AI, what came back out and who reviewed it has been built and tested on synthetic data only, and linking it to the evidence behind each conclusion is in development.

How is agent output checked?

A separate verification step tries to falsify the output before a person relies on it.

Does FDA or EMA have rules specifically for AI agents?

Not specifically for agents, but existing record rules still apply where agents handle regulated records: 21 CFR Part 11 and FDA's predicate rules for required records, and EU GMP Annex 11 for computerised systems used in GMP-regulated activities. FDA's January 2025 draft guidance describes a risk-based credibility assessment for AI models that produce information supporting regulatory decisions on safety, effectiveness or quality, tied to the model's context of use; it is still a draft and excludes AI used only for drug discovery. The EMA reflection paper, published in September 2024, sets out non-binding considerations for AI across the medicinal product lifecycle, and in January 2026 FDA and EMA published ten joint guiding principles for good AI practice in drug development. None of these is a security standard, so security controls come from frameworks such as NIST and OWASP.

How does an engagement start?

With an AI risk assessment of your current AI use and data exposure. Each engagement then states which controls are built, which are tested and which are in development before anything is set up. Contact Atlas Bio to scope it.

  1. NIST AI 100-1, Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)
  2. NIST AI 600-1, Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile
  3. NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 3, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations
  4. OWASP GenAI Security Project: Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026
  5. OWASP GenAI Security Project: LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection
  6. FDA draft guidance: Considerations for the Use of Artificial Intelligence to Support Regulatory Decision-Making for Drug and Biological Products (January 2025)
  7. FDA and EMA: Guiding Principles of Good AI Practice in Drug Development (January 2026)
  8. 21 CFR Part 11, Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures (eCFR)
  9. FDA guidance: Part 11, Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures — Scope and Application (September 2003)
  10. EMA: Reflection paper on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the medicinal product lifecycle (EMA/CHMP/CVMP/83833/2023)
  11. European Commission: EudraLex Volume 4, EU GMP Annex 11 — Computerised Systems

Start with an AI risk assessment.

Tell us how your team uses AI today and what data it touches. We will scope an AI risk assessment and state which controls are in use, tested or in development for the workflows that matter most.

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